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SECURITY CLEARANCE CONUNDRUM: THE NEED
FOR REFORM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Heidi Gilchrist *
A case can be made ... that secrecy is for losers. For peo-
ple who don't know how important information really is. The
Soviet Union realized this too late. Openness is now a singu-
lar, and singularly American, advantage. We put it in peril
by poking along in the mode of an age now past. It is time to
dismantle government secrecy, this most pervasive of Cold
War-era regulations. It is time to begin building the supports
for the era of openness that is already upon us.'
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you arrive at work as a scientist at one of the country's
foremost labs after twenty years of service. You are sipping your
coffee when security arrives and informs you that your security
clearance has been revoked and therefore, you are no longer au-
thorized to work there, or even be in the building. When you ask
why you have lost your security clearance, and thus your job, the
answer is you are a national security risk and it would even be a
threat to national security to tell you why. You try to appeal the
decision, but you are told it is final. You think to yourself, I am an
American, I have certain indelible rights, so you go to an attor-
ney. You take the agency you work for to court, the court tells you
that it is very sorry but no one has a right to a security clearance
because matters of national security are committed to the Execu-
tive Branch, and the court cannot examine the merits of a securi-
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ty clearance decision. Your scientific research and expertise in-
volve national security and there are no jobs that you are quali-
fied for that would not require a clearance. You think to yourself,
now what? This is not fiction, this is the current law of national
security clearances.
One need only to look at recent headlines to understand the
importance of security clearance decisions and the severe flaws in
the system. The New York Times headlined in July 2016: "Email
Case May Complicate Clinton Aides' Pursuit of Security Clear-
ance."2 In order to obtain top diplomatic or national security
posts, some of Clinton's aides will need a security clearance.3 For
millions of Americans, a security clearance leads to better pay
and job opportunities. In facing the terror threat, we need people
with language abilities and experience abroad. These people are
often unable to get cleared, or if they are, it can take years. At the
same time, we are faced with an 'insider threat' where those with
clearances are causing harm and even deaths. The system needs
to be reformed. However, as important as security clearances are,
most people, even those with a security clearance, do not fully
understand the security clearance process or the fact that if their
clearance is revoked, how little recourse they actually have.
Part I examines the case law of security clearances since the
1988 Supreme Court decision in Department of Navy v. Egan that
has been interpreted broadly to mean that courts do not have the
authority to examine the merits of a security clearance decision.
Drawing on examples since 9/11, this article details two cases in-
volving Muslim men who had worked for the United States gov-
ernment for decades when they had their security clearances re-
voked.4 It discusses how they were not fully informed of why their
security clearance was revoked, and shows how courts were com-
pletely deferential to the agencies' decisions to revoke the clear-
ances.' It then elaborates on areas in the periphery of security
clearance decisions where courts have held that they have the
ability to review the decisions. Part II discusses the special situa-
2. Eric Lichtblau & Steven Lee Meyers, Email Case May Complicate Clinton Aides'
Pursuit of Security Clearance, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com2016/07
/07/us/state-department-emails-fbi.html.
3. See id.
4. See El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 591 F.3d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 2010); Makky v.
Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2008).
5. El-Ganayni, 591 F.3d at 181-82; Makky, 541 F.3d at 212-13.
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tion of whistleblowers in the intelligence community. If individu-
als in the intelligence community blow the whistle and then their
security clearance is revoked, they lose their job. However, courts,
under Egan, still cannot review the merits of the revocation of
their clearance. Therefore, these individuals are left completely
without recourse. Part III shows reform is needed because there
are serious problems in the security clearance process. Those with
critical skills are not getting cleared or take years to get cleared,
and persons who should never have a clearance have obtained
them, creating an insider threat situation. This article then dis-
cusses reforms that are currently being made and that further re-
forms are still needed. The article concludes by arguing that se-
curity clearances are not like wartime battlefield decisions, but
are generally discrimination and retaliation claims that Article
III judges are wholly competent to make, and should make, to en-
sure the integrity of the security clearance process and the safety
of the country.
I. SECURITY CLEARANCE DECISIONS
A. No Avenue for Redress
If an individual's security clearance is denied or revoked, there
is no avenue for the individual to contest the denial or revocation
on the merits. Although courts have said there is the possibility of
review if an agency has not followed its own procedures,6 and
even the Supreme Court has indicated there may be the possibil-
ity of review when the Constitution has been violated,7 no case
has actually been successful. It is accepted that "no one has a
'right' to a security clearance"8 and "genuine and legitimate doubt
is to be resolved in favor of national security."9 Without review,
this leads to the troubling situation where those making security
clearance decisions operate knowing no one will ever review the
decisions they are making.
The reasoning from the Supreme Court in Department of the
Navy v. Egan,1° echoed by other courts, is that courts lack the ex-
6. Duane v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 275 F.3d 988, 993 (10th Cir. 2002).
7. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988).
8. Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
9. Berry v. Conyers, 692 F.3d 1223, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
10. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
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pertise to make the judgment required in a security clearance
case and that matters of national security should be left to the
Executive Branch.1' The Court reasoned that "[t]he attempt to de-
fine not only the individual's future actions, but those of outside
and unknown influences renders the 'grant or denial of security
clearances ... an inexact science at best""' and that a
"[p]redictive judgment of this kind must be made by those with
the necessary expertise in protecting classified information.""
The Court expanded on its reasoning, giving absolute deference to
the agency making the decision:
[T]he protection of classified information must be committed to the
broad discretion of the agency responsible, and this must include
broad discretion to determine who may have access to it. Certainly,
it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to review
the substance of such a judgment and to decide whether the agency
should have been able to make the necessary affirmative prediction
with confidence. Nor can such a body determine what constitutes an
acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential risk.
14
The Court concluded that the authority given to the agency in de-
ciding security clearance cases is final: '[A]n agency head who
must bear the responsibility for the protection of classified infor-
mation committed to his custody should have the final say in de-
ciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access
to such information.... ' As noted above, this must be a judgment
call."
15
11. Thomas Egan was denied a security clearance and therefore lost his job at a naval
facility. Id. at 520. According to the letter of intent to deny a security clearance he received
from the Director of the Naval Civilian Personnel Command, the reason was because of
criminal convictions for assault, being a felon in possession of a gun, and for his failure to
disclose two earlier convictions on his application for federal employment. Id. at 521. Also
mentioned were his past alcohol problems. Id. Egan sought review because he said he had
paid his debt to society for his convictions, that he did not list convictions older than seven
years because he interpreted the employment form as not requiring that information, and
that alcohol had not been a problem for him for three years. Id. He also submitted favora-
ble material from supervisors as to his background and character. Id. The Director of the
Naval Civilian Personnel Command reviewed his submission and determined that it did
not "sufficiently explain, mitigate, or refute the reasons on which the proposed denial was
based. Accordingly, respondent's security clearance was denied." Id. at 522. This is even
after the Court stated at the outset of its opinion, "[t]he narrow question presented by this
case is whether the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) has authority by statute to
review the substance of an underlying decision to deny or revoke a security clearance in
the course of reviewing an adverse action." Id. at 520.
12. Id. at 529 (quoting Adams v. Laird, 420 F.2d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
13. Id. at 529.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956)).
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The Court also discussed how matters of foreign affairs more
generally should be left to the Executive Branch. "The Court also
has recognized 'the generally accepted view that foreign policy
was the province and responsibility of the Executive.' ' 16 "As to
these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown
the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities."" The Court
then concluded, "[t]hus, unless Congress specifically has provided
otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude up-
on the authority of the Executive in military and national securi-
ty affairs."'" Therefore, under Egan, security clearance decisions
are often dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
security clearance decisions are committed to the "sole discretion
of the executive branch."'9
Louis Fisher has argued that although Egan is cited for the
broad proposition that the "President has broad and exclusive
powers under Article II of the Constitution to control access to
national security information, especially classified documents," in
reality, "[n]othing in Egan recognizes a plenary or exclusive pow-
er on the part of the President over classified information., 20 He
also highlights the majority ruling-"unless Congress specifically
has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant
to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and na-
tional security affairs"-to advocate that "[m]embers of Congress
have both the authority and the duty to exercise their own powers
under Article I.,,21 However, Congress has not acted in this area
and judges remain extremely deferential to Executive decisions in
this area.
After Egan, courts have consistently held that they cannot re-
view a case that would have them review the merits of the under-
lying security clearance decision. Plaintiffs have brought cases
under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Privacy Act, Fifth
Amendment rights to Due Process and Equal Protection, and Ti-
tle VII to no avail.22 To avoid Egan, plaintiffs have argued that
16. Id. (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-94 (1981)).
17. Id. at 529-30 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
18. Id. at 530.
19. See, e.g., Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120617, at
*8 (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010).
20. Louis Fisher, Judicial Interpretations of Egan, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS No.
2010-003499, at 1, 27 (2009).
21. Id. at 10 (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 530).
22. See, e.g., Peter B. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 620 F. Supp. 2d 58, 64 (D.D.C.
2017]
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they are not disputing the merits of the security clearance deci-
sion but allege discrimination that led up to it.23 However, in the
words of the D.C. District Court, "[tlhe D.C. Circuit has long ap-
plied Egan's preclusion principle not only to bar lawsuits that
seek to challenge security clearance determinations directly ...
but also to prevent the progression of employment discrimination
and retaliation actions that are, at bottom, based on an alleged
improper denial or revocation of security clearance. '24 Some
courts clearly state they cannot review the case at all.25 However,
other courts state they can review some parts of the case, but ul-
timately conclude they cannot review the case because it would
engage the court in second-guessing the Executive Branch.26 Oth-
er courts have held that a court may only review, "whether a se-
curity clearance was denied, whether the security clearance was a
requirement of the appellant's position, and whether the proce-
dures set forth in [the applicable statute] were followed...
which essentially leads to the conclusion that they cannot review
a security clearance decision.
Courts have even found that those with a revoked security
clearance do not have access to the case against them if that in-
formation itself is classified:
[b]ecause Mr. Gargiulo had no due process rights with respect to the
procedures used to determine whether to suspend or revoke his secu-
rity clearance, he had no constitutional right to receive the documen-
tary evidence underlying the security clearance suspension before
his indefinite suspension from employment took effect. He had due
process rights with respect to his indefinite suspension, but they did
not include the right to contest the merits of the decision to suspend
his security clearance.28
2009).
23. Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).
24. Horsey v. U.S. Dep't of State, 2006 F. Supp. 3d 256, 268 (D.D.C. 2016) (citations
omitted).
25. See, e.g., Peter B., 620 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
26. See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996).
27. Romero v. Dep't of Def., 527 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Hesse v.
Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
28. E.g., Gargiulo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see
Peter Finn, U.S. Strips Intelligence Analyst of Security Clearance and Job but Won't Say
Why, WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2010, 10:51 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/
content/article2010/11/26/AR2010112605017.html (discussing the Pentagon's justification
of its decision by relying on a national security clause that states "it would harm the inter-
ests of the United States to inform him of the accusations against him").
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Therefore, an individual may have their security clearance re-
voked, and then be told they do not have access to the information
because they no longer have a valid security clearance.
Makky v. Chertoff illustrates the nonsensical position courts
are placed in when they review a security clearance revocation
without being able to review the merits.29 The court says it can
review "[a plaintiffs] claim of discrimination because a discrimi-
nation claim under a mixed-motive theory does not necessarily
require consideration of the merits of a security clearance deci-
sion ." However, the court then "reiterate[s] that in analyzing
Makky's mixed-motive Title VII claim, we cannot question the
motivation behind the decision to deny Makky's security clear-
ance."31 It seems impossible to consider the mixed-motive, without
questioning the motivation. The court then says Makky was not
minimally qualified for his position without a clearance.3 2 "A se-
curity clearance is the minimum requirement needed to hold
Makky's position. Thus, as of January 2005, when Makky's clear-
ance was suspended, he was not qualified on the most basic level
to perform his job. 33 However, that was what Makky was contest-
ing. The reasoning is circular, leaving those revoking the clear-
ance the final say without any review.
Makky also sued for violations of procedural due process,
claiming he was denied adequate notice of the underlying reason
for his suspension. 34 He stated that if he had access to the materi-
al,35 he could have contested the Transportation Security Admin-
istration's ("TSA") allegations.36 But the court found, "[b]ecause
Makky did not have the requisite security clearance at the time
he sought the classified information, TSA could not release that
information to him."37 In situations like Makky, a plaintiff is left
in an untenable situation where their security clearance has been
revoked and the information detailing why their clearance was
29. 541 F.3d 205, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2008).
30. Id. at 213.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 216.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. They were released later, well after his suspension. Id. at 218.
36. Id.
37. Id.
2017]
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revoked is classified. Thus, the plaintiff cannot access the infor-
mation to contest the revocation decision.
Prior to the lawsuit, Dr. Wagih Makky emigrated to the United
States from Egypt, became a naturalized citizen of the United
States, and was "a prominent researcher and university professor
in the field of aviation security, and is considered to be a technical
expert in that field."38 In fact, after the bombing of a Pan Ameri-
can Airways airplane over Lockerbie, Scotland, the United States
government "asked Makky to create a unit within the Federal
Aviation Administration... for the purpose of developing tech-
nology to detect and prevent explosives from being detonated
aboard commercial planes and trains."39
Following general procedures, he submitted his required secu-
rity clearance renewal application in March 2002.0 On March 19,
2003, the day the United States invaded Iraq, he was placed on
paid administrative leave and told not to come to work. 1 Makky,
on paper, appears to be exactly who the United States govern-
ment wants working for it. Perhaps there was a real reason be-
hind revoking his security clearance, but would not it have been
worth making absolutely sure prejudice and paranoia after Sep-
tember 11, 2001 didn't play a role?
Another case illustrating the necessity of judicial review is El-
Ganayni v. U.S. Department of Energy. In El-Ganayni, a native-
born Egyptian who became an American citizen in 1988 was
hired as a physicist at Bettis Laboratory in 1990."2 The lab is ded-
icated to the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, "a joint Navy-
DOE program responsible for the design, construction, operation,
and maintenance of nuclear-powered warships." 3 He worked
there for seventeen years and "never received a negative perfor-
mance evaluation and was never accused of misconduct. 4 4 He re-
ceived a security clearance in 1990, his clearance was reevaluated
five times between 1990 and 2007, and he retained his clearance
throughout that time.4 ' El-Ganayni was Muslim. 4 In 2006, after
38. Id. at 207-08.
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 208-09.
41. Id. at 209.
42. E1-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 591 F.3d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") raided a mosque in
Pittsburgh during a prayer service, El-Ganayni gave a speech
condemning the raid and criticizing American foreign policy, es-
pecially the United States' involvement in Iraq.4" In June or July
2007, El-Ganayni gave a speech at a mosque promoting prison
outreach, but after seeing FBI brochures recruiting Muslim in-
formants, he "told congregants that they should report crimes if
they knew of any, but that they should not serve as informants
for the FBI until it stopped acting like a political organization."4
Finally, El-Ganayni, while serving as an Imam at a prison, dis-
tributed a book about Islam titled, The Miracle in the Ant, which
"contained a passage about a defense mechanism found in certain
ants which allows them to burst open their body wall and spray
deadly secretions upon attackers."9
After being interviewed in October 2007 by the Bettis Labora-
tory Security Manager about whether he supported killing Amer-
icans and whether The Miracle in the Ant could be construed to
encourage suicide bombings, he was interviewed by the FBI who
also asked about whether he was a member of Hamas or al-Qaeda
and his views on the Quran. ° In December 2007, he received a
letter saying he was suspended with pay, but then he was placed
on reduced pay.5 ' Then, in January 2008 he received a letter say-
ing:
Reliable information in the possession of the Department of Energy
indicates that you have knowingly established or continued sympa-
thetic association with a saboteur, spy, terrorist, traitor, seditionist,
anarchist, or revolutionist, espionage agent, or representative of a
foreign nation whose interests are inimical to the United States, its
territories or possessions, or with any person advocating the use of
force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States
or any state or subdivision thereof by unconstitutional means.
52
In the letter, there was also an explanation about the procedures
by which El-Ganayni could challenge these allegations." He re-
quested a hearing but, after an initial conference, was informed
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 178.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 179.
52. Id.
53. Id.
2017]
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that the Department of Energy ("DOE") had terminated the pro-
ceedings.54 On May 19, 2008, after revoking El-Ganayni's security
clearance, Acting Deputy Secretary of Energy Kupfer "certified
under Executive Order 12968 that the usual procedures available
in security clearance revocation proceedings could not 'be made
available ... without damaging the interests of national security
by revealing classified information."'55 Kupfer stated the decision
was "conclusive," but did not describe the specific national securi-
ty concerns behind the decision. 6 El-Ganayni's security clearance
was revoked; he was never told the reasons why and even the
procedures generally available in a security clearance revocation
case were not available to him.
Once again, the court in El-Ganayni was placed in the bizarre
situation where it could look at the constitutional claims arising
from the revocation process but only to the "extent that we can do
so without examining the merits of that decision."57 The Third
Circuit reversed the district court for dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction based on Egan and Stehney, but then said it could
not look at the merits of the case because of Egan.5" In Count I,
"El-Ganayni claimed the DOE retaliated against him for constitu-
tionally protected speech by revoking his security clearance.59 In
order to state a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must
show, "'that his conduct was constitutionally protected"' and that
'his protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in
the alleged retaliatory action."'65 Although the court admitted that
El-Ganayni "could easily establish that the political and religious
speech that allegedly led to the revocation of his clearance was
constitutionally protected," the court then said it could not look at
the second prong without examining the merits of the DOE's de-
cision, so it failed.5 Therefore, it would seem more straightfor-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 183 (citing Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
although the merits of the revocation decision were non-reviewable, Article III courts have
jurisdiction to hear "constitutional claims arising from the clearance revocation process")).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 184.
60. Id. (quoting Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2002)).
61. Id. ("Proving that El-Ganayni's political speech was 'a substantial or motivating
factor' in the decision to revoke his clearance would inevitably require review of the merits
of the DOE's decision. There is simply no way to prove or disprove what was--or perhaps
more importantly for this case, what was not-a 'substantial or motivating factor' in the
[Vol. 51:953
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ward to have dismissed it as non-justiciable, because "[w]hatever
else happened, the DOE would always prevail because of Egan. In
short, [the court] believe[d] that Egan present[ed] an 'insuperable
bar to relief."'62 In Count II, El-Ganayni alleged "the DOE and
Kupfer violated his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection by
discriminating against him on the basis of his religion and na-
tional origin."" Although stating it had the jurisdiction to hear
the claim, the court dismissed it under the same reasoning as
Count I: "neither El-Ganayni nor a court could compel the DOE to
offer a 'non-discriminatory explanation' for its decision to revoke
El-Ganayni's clearance.... It is beyond judicial review." 4
Finally, the court found that the DOE followed the applicable
regulations and executive orders meaning there was no violation
of the Administrative Procedure Act, even though El-Ganayni
was not given a reason for the revocation of his security clearance
and thus his job. 5 And he did not even have the benefit of the
procedures generally available in a revocation case. The court cit-
ed Executive Order 10865, "Safeguarding Classified Information
Within Industry," and discussed how it provided "minimum pro-
cedures required in clearance revocation proceedings."66 However,
the court then stated: "[t]he Order also preserves the authority of
the head of an agency to bypass any procedure otherwise provid-
ed under the Order, if he determines that such procedures 'cannot
be invoked consistently with the national security"' and such de-
termination is "conclusive."67 Similarly, the court discussed Exec-
utive Order 12968 and all of its procedural safeguards68 but then
said that the agency's head can bypass the procedures in a par-
ticular case if it would "damag[e] the national security interests
of the United States., 69 The court completely deferred to the DOE,
decision to revoke El-Ganayni's clearance without demanding some explanation of that
decision from the DOE. It would require discovery of DOE officials and documents con-
cerning the various 'factors' that led to the decision to revoke the clearance, and scrutiny
of those factors to determine which were 'substantial' or 'motivating.' We can discern no
difference between that inquiry and the review of the merits that is forbidden by Egan.")
(citations omitted).
62. Id. at 185.
63. Id. at 180.
64. Id. at 186.
65. Id. at 186-87.
66. Id. at 187 (quoting Exec. Order No. 10865, 3 C.F.R. § 9 (Supp. 1960)); see also 10
C.F.R. § 710.1(b) (2016).
67. El-Ganayni, 591 F.3d at 187.
68. Id. at 188 (citing Exec. Order No. 12968, 3 C.F.R. § 5.2(a)(1)-(7) (1995)).
69. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 12968, 3 C.F.R. § 5.2(d) (1995)).
2017]
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saying that it properly revoked El-Ganayni's security clearance,
and basically the reasoning is because they said they had to. Once
again, perhaps there was an excellent reason for revoking El-
Ganayni's security clearance, but it should not be hidden. And it
is a farce to say a court is examining the procedures when the on-
ly procedure is that they said what they did was in the interests
of "national security."
After the lawsuit, El-Ganayni, the respected nuclear physicist,
returned to Egypt after residing in the United States for twenty-
eight years, saying, "I feel very sad that the American people have
lost a good bit of their Constitution. John Adams said that once you
lose your rights and liberties, it's very hard to get them back.
7
Some courts do indeed seem troubled with the extreme defer-
ence given to the Executive Branch in this area, but feel power-
less to challenge Executive Branch authority in the area of na-
tional security after Egan and perhaps 9/11. The district court in
El-Ganayni stated, "[t]he Court recognizes Plaintiffs legitimate
concerns with unbridled executive power and is loath to conclude
that it does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim that an
American citizen's fundamental constitutional rights had been vi-
olated."'" However, it ultimately decided that it did not have ju-
risdiction." Another court stated, "Indeed, [the plaintiff] raises
legitimate concerns about granting the executive such unilateral
authority;" but it still decided that the "granting, denial, or revo-
cation of a security clearance is a sui generis act over which the
federal courts have no jurisdiction absent congressional di-
rective. 73 Some courts have given some leeway to plaintiffs who
may not even have access to their case, finding, "[w]here a 'plain-
tiff does not even know the precise contents of his records be-
cause ... he has no access to them, a plaintiff cannot be expected
to plead much detail.' 74 But this is not enough protection when
someone's livelihood is taken away.
70. Sally Kalson, Muslim Physicist Leaves U.S. After Losing Security Clearance, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 28, 2008), http://www.post-gazette.com/neighborhoods/2008/11/28/
Muslim-physicist-leaves-U-S-after-losing-security-clearance/stories/200811280 134.
71. El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88243, at *11-12 (W.D.
Penn. Oct. 31, 2008).
72. Id. at*18.
73. Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120617, at *9-10
(E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010).
74. Peter B. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 620 F. Supp. 2d 58, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (quot-
ing Doe v. Goss, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2708, at *30 (D.D.C., Jan. 12, 2007)).
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We can say err on the side of caution so that we will all sleep
better at night. But what has been termed 'caution' could also
jeopardize national security. We need diversity in our intelligence
services. We need to think about problems in unique and different
ways-studies have shown that diverse groups make better deci-
sions. Someone who grew up Muslim, or in Bosnia or Thailand,
may be able to think of jihadi terror in a different way. Addition-
ally, people who have travelled abroad or speak foreign languages
can give insight into regions that a textbook could never provide.
United States intelligence agencies need people who can parse
difficult and contrary data and consider multiple perspectives,
not only think one mindset is correct. Language and cultural
knowledge "makes you more sensitive to nuance, which is what
investigations are often all about."76 Further study would need to
be done, but it is also worrisome that many of the recent cases in
which a security clearance was revoked concerned an ethnic or re-
ligious minority.
Judicial review would bring about a necessary inner reflection.
Even if courts may mostly agree with security clearance deci-
sions, because there would have to be a high standard of defer-
ence given to the Executive Branch, those making clearance deci-
sions will know that their decisions could ultimately go to a trier
of fact and will have to, at least minimally, conform their behav-
ior to fit the existing standards.
All of these cases deal with the revocation of a security clear-
ance. When a person is initially denied a security clearance, he or
she is in an even more difficult situation as it would be nearly
impossible to get past the Egan threshold. Therefore, there is no
way to know how many people there are who could help our coun-
try, especially with critical language skills we need, but are una-
ble to get past the clearance process. John Miller, the Deputy
Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism for the New
75. See Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PROc.
NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 18524, 18525 (2014); see also Sheen S. Levine & David Stark, Diversity
Makes You Brighter, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/opin
iondiversity-makes-you-brighter.html ("Diversity improves the way people think. By dis-
rupting conformity, racial and ethnic diversity prompts people to scrutinize facts, think
more deeply and develop their own opinions. Our findings show that such diversity actual-
ly benefits everyone, minorities and majority alike.").
76. Dan Eggen, FBI Agents Still Lacking Arabic Skills, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001388.
html (quoting Professor Daniel Byman).
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York Police Department ("NYPD"), stated that fifteen of the nine-
teen arrests by the FBI that led to charges such as planning to
join Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ("ISIL") came from an
NYPD unit where several dozen multilingual individuals sift
through various websites and social media.77 Why? He said, "[w]e
have an easier time getting Arabic speakers than the FBI, be-
cause we don't have to put them through the security clearances
that the [B]ureau does. 78
B. Possible Openings
Some courts have indicated that review may be possible for
constitutional claims. In fact, the Supreme Court, in the same
year that Egan was decided, held "[n]othing in [section] 102(c)
persuades us that Congress meant to preclude consideration of
colorable constitutional claims arising out of the actions of the Di-
rector pursuant to that section; we believe that a constitutional
claim based on an individual discharge may be reviewed by the
District Court."79 However, this has been interpreted by some
courts to only apply to the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")
because it was decided under section 102(c) of the National Secu-
rity Act, leading to the odd conclusion that only CIA employees
are entitled to constitutional review."0 Another court "left open
the question of whether we can review a security clearance deci-
sion even where an individual presents a colorable claim that the
agency's decision violated his or her constitutional rights."'" And
still other courts find that they can only review constitutional vio-
lations in the process of revoking a clearance.82 However, no case
77. Steven Brill, 15 Years After 9/11, Is America Any Safer?, THE ATLANTIc (Sept.
2016), http://www.the atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761.
78. Id.
79. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988).
80. See, e.g., El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88243, at
*13-14 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2008) ("However, Webster is distinguishable because it was a
statutory interpretation case, which construed the delegation of power to the Director of
CIA contained in § 102(c) of the National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 403(c). By contrast, the
authority of the executive branch to revoke security clearances is not derived from a stat-
ute, but flows directly from the United States Constitution, Art. II, § 2, 'and exists quite
apart from any explicit congressional grant.'... Thus, the fact that Congress did not em-
power the CIA Director to evade judicial review of constitutional claims when terminating
an employee is not precedential to the issues in this case." (quoting Dep't of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988)).
81. Hegab v. Long, 716 F.3d 790, 795 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted).
82. See, e.g., El-Ganayni v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 591 F.3d 176, 183-86 (3d Cir. 2010)
(finding that courts only move jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims arising out of the
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has successfully challenged the revocation or denial of a security
clearance, and only one case has examined the merits of a securi-
ty clearance decision."
Even when there is a colorable constitutional claim, courts
have found other ways to dismiss the case. Both concurrences in
Hegab v. Long found that colorable constitutional claims were
brought, but found other ways to concur in the dismissal of the
case. 4 Judge Motz's concurrence states: "[i]n light of the holding
in Egan, at most Webster permits judicial review of a security
clearance denial only when that denial results from the applica-
tion of an allegedly unconstitutional policy. Since Hegab alleges
no unconstitutional policy but only an assertedly unconstitutional
individualized adverse determination, his claim fails.""5 Judge
Davis' concurrence states that Hegab's claims raise a non-
justiciable political question." No matter how it is framed, the in-
dividual who is denied a security clearance or has their security
clearance revoked, even when they claim a constitutional viola-
tion has occurred, is left in the same situation-without judicial
review of the determination because of the broad deference to the
Executive Branch.
Although other courts have stated that constitutional claims or
claims regarding the process behind the revocation, can go for-
ward, no court has actually examined the merits of a security
clearance decision, except for the Ninth Circuit in High Tech
Gays. 7 The Ninth Circuit ultimately found against the plaintiff
clearance revocation process).
83. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir.
1990) (subjecting security clearance regulations that impinged upon a fundamental right
to strict scrutiny, but ultimately holding that they survived strict scrutiny).
84. See Hegab, 716 F.3d at 799 (Davis, J., concurring) ("Reading the material allega-
tions of the complaint in the light most favorable to Hegab, the only thing that changed is
he got married to a dual citizen Muslim activist who, before their marriage, robustly exer-
cised her First Amendment rights of speech and association. I do not regard Hegab's alle-
gations as 'conclusory'; rather, I regard them as 'colorable' within the contemplation of our
precedents. Unlike the allegations in many extant cases raising claims of unconstitutional
security clearance revocations, the gravamen of Hegab's complaint is the alleged denial of
equal protection, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.") (footnote omitted); see id. at 797
(Motz, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 798 (Motz, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 799-800 ("[Wlhether the agency revoked his security clearance on legitimate
national security grounds, or whether the decision 'was based solely on [Hegab's] wife's
religion, Islam[;] her constitutionally protected speech[;] and her [mere] association with,
and employment by, an Islamic faith-based organization."').
87. See High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 565.
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because "[h]is membership in a homosexual organization was
simply one of the many facets of the criteria being considered as
part of [his] homosexual activities. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claim
that consideration of these five criteria is unconstitutional must
fail."88
Although some courts state that they can examine constitu-
tional violations in the process of revoking a clearance, others
have found this to be an impossible task as it would ultimately
involve looking at the merits of the case. Many courts cite to
Stehney for the proposition that courts can review the process of
revoking a clearance:
Stehney has not asked for a review of the merits of NSA's revocation
decision. Rather, she asserts NSA violated her constitutional and
regulatory rights in revoking her clearance. Therefore, we cannot
agree with the district court that the political question doctrine pre-
cludes review of her claims. Accordingly, to the extent that Stehney
seeks review of whether NSA complied with its own regulations or
violated her constitutional rights, we believe she presents a justicia-
ble claim. 9
However, other courts have indicated that it is impossible to look
at the process without examining the merits and therefore decline
to review. But courts should look at process arguments because
in many contexts, process can be separated from the merits of the
dispute.
Plaintiffs have tried many creative suits to avoid saying they
are disputing the merits of the security clearance decision, with-
out success. However, some cases have allowed plaintiffs to go
forward where the cases have touched on security clearances in-
directly. The court in Zeinali focused on the fact that in employ-
ment discrimination suits against private employers, "courts can
generally avoid examining the merits of the government's securi-
ty clearance decision."91
We hold that we have jurisdiction to adjudicate Zeinali's discrimina-
tory termination claim, as he does not dispute the merits of the ex-
ecutive branch's decision to deny his security clearance application.
88. Id. at 579.
89. Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 932 (3d Cir. 1996).
90. See, e.g., Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120617, at
*10-11 (E.D. Va. Nov. 15, 2010) ('To avoid Egan, Ciralsky's counsel at oral argument stat-
ed that the claims arise not from the revocation of his security clearance but from the con-
stitutional violations that led to the revocation. This distinction is illusory.").
91. Zemali v. Raytheon Co., 636 F.3d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Rather, he disputes the bona fides of Raytheon's professed security
clearance requirement, and he introduces evidence showing
that Raytheon retained similarly situated non-Iranian engineers
who lacked security clearances. We reverse the district court and
hold that Zeinali's discrimination claim may proceed.
92
At least in the Ninth Circuit, the court did not unnecessarily ex-
pand the doctrine to include all cases touching upon security
clearances indirectly.
The D.C. Circuit also decided not to expand the doctrine as
urged by the government to include security referrals.93 However,
this is a narrow opening as it only applies to cases where the re-
ferral was made using information known to be false.94 In 2001,
Rattigan, an employee of the FBI, pursued a discrimination claim
against his supervisors with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC").95 He then alleged that FBI officials retali-
ated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, when they reported "unfounded security concerns to the
Bureau's Security Division" prompting "an investigation into his
continued eligibility for a security clearance. 96 The Security Divi-
sion did not revoke his clearance, but rather deemed the security
concerns of his superiors to be unfounded.97 The court gave a new,
narrow opening for security clearance cases to go forward, hold-
ing that "Rattigan's Title VII claim may proceed only if he can
show that agency employees acted with a retaliatory or discrimi-
natory motive in reporting or referring information that they
knew to be false."" The court based its decision on an executive
order, even though there is a conflicting federal statute.99
92. Id. at 546.
93. Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764, 768, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
94. Id. at 770; see Demetri Blaisdell, Note, Title VII Challenges to Security Clearance
Referrals: Ratigan Points the Way, 4 COLuM. J. RACE & L. 177, 201 (2014).
95. Rattigan, 689 F.3d at 765.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 771; see Burns-Ramirez v. Napolitano, 962 F. Supp. 2d 253, 257-58 (D.D.C.
2013) ("Rattigan I and H are clear that security personnel decisions regarding whether to
investigate, suspend, or revoke a clearance are protected from review, but the actions of
other employees who knowingly and falsely refer a matter for investigation due to discrim-
ination or retaliation are not protected from review.").
99. Erica Newland, Executive Orders in Court, 124 YALE L.J. 2026, 2065-66 (2015)
("In other words, in Rattigan, the court placed an executive order that was issued in the
'zone of twilight,' and pursuant to concurrently shared authority, on equal footing with a
conflicting statute-and then tried to harmonize the two. It did so without inquiry into
whether Congress, in passing Title VII, intended to preclude 'zone of twilight' executive
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Courts are using the narrow opening from Rattigan to allow
cases to go forward that would have been dismissed at the outset
under Egan. Looking at the carve-out from Rattigan, the District
of D.C. allowed a plaintiff to replead his motion "if the alleged ba-
sis for the wrongful revocation of [the plaintiffs] security clear-
ance was a knowingly false and discriminatory report or refer-
ral.""1 ' Even though the plaintiff had not mentioned Rattigan, the
court stated, "it appears that a viable claim of [a Rattigan] nature
might be lurking within this case."'01 Whether courts will further
expand this opening will be closely watched.
Courts have also found that they can review cases where indi-
viduals were terminated due to unsuitability and there was no
indication that national security was implicated. "[T]he court de-
nies defendant's motion to dismiss and finds that there is subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claims regarding his termina-
tion from Customs and Border Patrol because there is no evidence
in the record that CBP terminated plaintiff on the basis of a na-
tional security determination."'0 2 Similarly, the court in Jones v.
Ashcroft held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to review a
plaintiffs Title VII claim challenging the FBI's rescission of the
plaintiffs employment offer after the FBI determined from a
background investigation that the plaintiff was unsuitable for the
position because the suitability determination was not "made in
the interest of national security."'' The court pointed out that
there was "no evidence before th[e] Court to indicate that the
government, at any time prior to the commencement of th[e] law-
suit, considered national security as a basis for its decision not to
hire the plaintiff."'0 4
In Toy v. Holder, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend Egan be-
yond security clearances, finding that the denial of access to a
building is different from security clearance cases, but then held
it must defer to the Executive Branch because building access is a
matter of national security.' "[Slecurity-clearance decisions are
orders of this nature. This case thereby illustrates one means through which courts inter-
pret executive orders to deprive Congress-and its statutes--of their due power.").
100. Horsey v. U.S. Dep't of State, 170 F. Supp. 3d 256, 270 (D.D.C. 2016).
101. Id.
102. Corbett v. Napolitano, 897 F. Supp. 2d 96, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
103. Jones v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2004).
104. Id. at 8.
105. Toy v. Holder, 714 F.3d 881, 884-85 (5th Cir. 2013).
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made by specialized groups of persons, charged with guarding ac-
cess to secured information, who must make repeated deci-
sions.""1 6 The court then contrasted this with building access:
"[b]uilding access may be revoked, as in this case, by a supervisor,
someone who does not specialize in making security decisions.' ' 7
The court concluded that "[a] lack of oversight, process, and con-
sidered decision-making separates this case from Egan, which
therefore does not bar Toy's suit."' However, the court went on
to find that Toy's suit was barred because Executive Order 12968
applied to Toy as a contract employee, and under that order "the
agency has the ability to grant or deny access to facilities within
its discretion based on considerations of national security.""'
Therefore, once again, absolute deferral to the Executive Branch
because of national security is found.
The vast majority of cases dealing in any way with a security
clearance revocation are dismissed at the outset. The government
also argues for expansion of Egan into every area touching on se-
curity clearances."0 In fact, in 2013, the Federal Circuit expanded
Egan's broad reach to "noncritical sensitive" positions, adding
hundreds of thousands of federal employees that will not have ac-
cess to appeal the merits of adverse actions."' In justifying its
broad holding the court stated, "[i]t is naive to suppose that em-
ployees without direct access to already classified information
cannot affect national security. The Board and Northover's nar-
row focus on access to classified information ignores the impact
employees without security clearances, but in sensitive positions,
can have.""' 2 Therefore, employees who do not have access to clas-
sified information can have their jobs taken away without judicial
review of that decision. As the dissent pointed out, the very rea-
106. Id. at 885.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 885-86.
109. Id. at 887.
110. See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ("On rehearing,
the government argues that decisions to report security concerns come within Egan's scope
because they 'involve precisely the same type of predictions about risks to national securi-
ty' as the decision to grant or deny clearance .... ") (quoting Brief for Appellant on Panel
Rehearing at 6, Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 10-5014)).
111. Kaplan v. Conyers, 733 F.3d 1148, 1159-60 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see Alexandra Cum-
ings, Comment, Kaplan v. Conyers: Preventing the Grocery Store Clerk From Disclosing
National Security Secrets, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 553, 554, 556 (2014) (arguing that the ex-
pansion of Egan to personnel with sensitive positions "disrupts congressional intent, prec-
edent, and the rights of millions of federal employees").
112. Kaplan, 733 F.3d at 1163.
2017]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
son Congress gave civil service employees Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board"' ("MSPB") review was so they would "be 'protected
against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and... partisan po-
litical coercion' that may occur within government agencies."''
They just lost that protection.
Courts should look to Webster and review security clearance
decisions where there are constitutional claims. There is no rea-
son for absolute deference to the Executive Branch in this area,
and courts should review for both violations of the Constitution in
the process of revoking or denying a security clearance, and the
actual merits of the decision.
II. WHISTLEBLOWERS
We need whistleblowers, but if further protections are not put
in place, federal employees working in intelligence with security
clearances will not blow the whistle as they have little or no pro-
tection for continued employment after they have done so if the
agency employing them revokes their security clearance.'15 Courts
have held that under Egan, they cannot review a security clear-
ance decision even when the employee is alleging that their secu-
rity clearance has been revoked in retaliation for whistleblow-
ing." ' Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held that "whistleblower
protection laws passed by Congress do not alter the constitutional
order, recognized in Egan, that gives the Executive Branch the
responsibility to make national security determinations.""' 7 With-
113, See About MSPB, U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD. http://www.mspb.gov/About/about.
htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) ("The Merit Systems Protection Board is an independent,
quasi-judicial agency in the Executive branch that serves as the guardian of Federal merit
systems .. .The mission of the MSPB is to promote an effective Federal workforce free of
Prohibited Personnel Practices.").
114. Kaplan, 733 F.3d at 1173 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-969, at 19
(1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2741).
115. See RODNEY M. PERRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43765, INTELLIGENCE
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS: IN BRIEF 1 (2014) ("Generally speaking, whistleblowers
are those who expose misconduct (e.g., fraud, abuse, or illegal activity) within an organiza-
tion. In the context of the Intelligence Community (IC), whistleblowers are generally em-
ployees or contractors of federal intelligence agencies who bring to light information on
agency wrongdoings. Whistleblowers disclose this information through government chan-
nels (e.g., the congressional intelligence committees or agency inspectors general) or to the
media. Such disclosures can aid oversight of, and thereby curb misconduct within, intelli-
gence agencies.").
116. See, e.g., Hesse v. Dep't of State, 217 F.3d 1372, 1377-80 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. de-
nied, 531 U.S. 1154 (2001).
117. Teufel v. Dep't of the Army, 608 F. App'x 705, 707 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hall v.
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out judicial review, once a security clearance is revoked, the whis-
tleblower is left without a job or any protection."'
The protections for whistleblowers in the intelligence commu-
nity are extremely limited. The Whistleblower Protection Act of-
fers broad protection to federal employees".9 but specifically ex-
cludes members of the intelligence community.2 ' Therefore,
Congress passed the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act of 1998 ("ICWPA").'2' However, the ICWPA only out-
lines procedures by which whistleblowers can report to Congress
a matter of "urgent concern"'22 and only after first bringing the
complaint or information to the agency head through proper
agency channels.'23 The ICWPA also specifically states that ac-
tions taken pursuant to it are not subject to judicial review. 2 4
U.S. Dep't of Labor, 476 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2007)).
118. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistleblower Spy: National Security
Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 493-94 (2014) ("Another common
criticism of the current whistleblower protection statutes is that they do not protect cov-
ered employees from security clearance-related retaliation .... Allowing agencies to alter
an employee's security clearance provides agencies with a back door way to effectively fire
or blacklist employees who blow the whistle.").
119. The Whistleblower Protection Act includes:
(A) [any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the
employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences-
(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authori-
ty, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety,
if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information
is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.
See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(S)(A)-(B) (2012).
120. See id. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I).
121. Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396. The ICWPA was codified in 50 U.S.C. §
3517(d)(5) for the CIA, and for all other intelligence organizations under 5 U.S.C. app. §
8H.
122. "Urgent concern" means any of the following:
(1) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order,
or deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operations of an intel-
ligence activity involving classified information, but does not include differ-
ences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
(II) A false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress,
on an issue of material fact relating to the funding, administration, or opera-
tion of an intelligence activity.
(III) An action, including a personnel action described in section
2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited
under subsection (e)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee's report-
ing an urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
50 U.S.C. § 3517(d)(5)(G)(i) (2012).
123. 50 U.S.C. § 3517(d)(5)(A) (Supp. II 2015).
124. Id. § 3517(d)(5)(F) (Supp. II 2015).
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Therefore, "absent any enforcement mechanism, the ICWPA ar-
guably fails to provide any real protection to national security
whistleblowers."'' President Obama implemented Presidential
Policy Directive 19 ("PPD-19") on October 10, 2012 to protect
whistleblowers with access to classified information."6 However,
it also lacks an enforcement mechanism, and requires employees
to first go to their supervisors.'27 If employees are complaining
about abuses within their own agency, their supervisors will not
give them the protection they need. Therefore, PPD-19 and
ICWPA ultimately will not safeguard members of the intelligence
community who blow the whistle and then have their security
clearance revoked.
The greatest step forward to date in protecting whistleblowers
is Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act, but judicial re-
view is still needed to properly protect whistleblowers. Title VI
prohibits an adverse personnel action as a
reprisal for a lawful disclosure of information ... to the Director of
National Intelligence[,] ... the appropriate inspector general of the
employing agency, a congressional intelligence committee, or a
member [there] . . .of which the employee reasonably believes evi-
dences-(1) a violation of any Federal law, rule, or regulation; or (2)
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
1 28
However, Title VI expressly leaves enforcement to the Presi-
dent. 129 Therefore, for those who have lost a security clearance,
and therefore their job, they will still not be able to contest the
revocation on the merits in court.
There are many examples of whistleblowers who have claimed
they were retaliated against by losing their clearances, but since
there is no external review process, it is impossible to know
whether their allegations are true or not.
When Ilana Greenstein blew the whistle on mismanagement at the
CIA, she tried to follow all the proper procedures. First, she told her
125. Papandrea, supra note 118, at 493.
126. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTivE[PPD-19:
PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS WITH ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 1 (2012), https:/
/fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd- 19.pdf [hereinafter PPD- 19].
127. See id. at 4. The External Review Panel can only make recommendations to the
agency head as to corrective actions that should be taken for the employee who has been
the subject of retaliation.
128. 50 U.S.C. § 3234(b) (Supp. II 2015).
129. Id. § 3234(c).
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supervisors that she believed the agency had bungled its spying op-
erations in Baghdad. Then, she wrote a letter to the director of the
agency. But the reaction from the intelligence agency she trusted
was to suspend her clearance and order her to turn over her personal
computers. The CIA then tried to get the Justice Department to open
a criminal investigation of her.
130
Greenstein is now employed as Of Counsel at a national security
law firm in Washington, D.C. 3 ' Wouldn't it have been nice to at
least explore her allegations?
The case of whistleblower Franz Gayl shows the importance of
protection for whistleblowers and how review by an outside board
can make a difference. Gayl was a senior science advisor for the
Marine Corps who advocated for Mine Resistant Ambush Pro-
tected vehicles ("MRAPs") during the Iraq war.132 When his re-
quests were ignored at the Pentagon, he spoke out publicly, going
to Congress and the media. 33 He "described the military's delay in
making a priority of the acquisition of the vehicles as 'criminal
negligence,' given their proven ability to protect troops against
improvised explosive devices." '134 He was then suspended and lost
his security clearance for alleged improper use of a flash drive on
a secure computer.135 "Former defense secretary Robert M. Gates
later cited media reports about the effectiveness of the vehicles,
largely based on Gayl's advocacy, in explaining his decision" to
make procurement a top priority.'36 The MSPB found "there are
reasonable grounds on which to believe that Mr. Gayl's indefinite
suspension is a result of his protected activity and is therefore
prohibited. . . .""' He was reinstated and able to return to work. 3 '
Because he worked for the military, Gayl at least had recourse to
130. Marisa Taylor, Intelligence, Defense Whistleblowers Remain Mired in Broken Sys-
tem, McCLATcHY (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/nation
allnational-security/article24777871.html.
131. Ilana S. Greenstein, Esq., LAW OFFICE OF MARK S. ZAID, P.C., http://www.mark
zaid.comlbiography.php?id=6 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
132. Jason Ukman, Whistleblower Franz Gayl Gets His Job Back, WASH. POST (Nov.
17, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.comblogs/checkpoint-washington/post/a-whistlebl
ower-gets-his-security-clearance-backI2011/11/17/gIQAWuJPUNblog.html?utm_terms=.7
46E93666923.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. R. Jeffrey Smith, Pentagon Whistleblower Franz Gayl is Reinstated, CTR. PUB.
INTEGRITY (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/l1/16/7417/pentagon-
whistle blower-franz-gayl-reinstated.
136. Ukman, supra note 132.
137. Gaylv. Dep't of the Navy, No. CB-1208-12-0001-U-1 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 13, 2011).
138. Ukman, supra note 132.
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the MSPB, which most in the intelligence community do not. Alt-
hough advocating for judicial review, any independent review
body would at least offer moderating influence. 9
III. REFORM
A. Recent Failures
Although courts have consistently held that they lack the nec-
essary expertise to decide security clearance cases, the current
system of clearances is under fire for severe inadequacies. Recent
events have called into question the process by which security
clearances are obtained and show that reform is needed. Aaron
Alexis murdered twelve of his colleagues and gained access to the
United States Navy office while having a security clearance.14 °
In his security clearance application, Alexis said he lived in Seattle
but worked in Manhattan. No one asked about that. Alexis told the
investigator that a felony arrest on his record was for letting air out
of someone's tires. He didn't mention that he let the air out with a
.45 caliber Glock handgun. That detail was in a Seattle police report
that also said Alexis had a "blackout fueled by anger." But there's no
record any investigator pursued that police report.
Similarly, there were many red flags raised about Bradley Man-
ning, who disclosed classified documents to WikiLeaks, none of
which were followed up with.14 There was a 911 call from his
stepmother: "[m]y husband's 18-year-old son is out of control and
just threatened me with a knife.'4 3 He, himself, even wrote that
he joined the military to "sort out the turmoil and mess in my
life."'44 Manning's supervisor went to her supervisor because of
various incidents, including pointing to the patch of the American
139. Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 367 (2014) ("A lack of any meaningful independent
review further increases the likelihood of error or abuse. The mere fact, or likelihood, of
independent review serves as a moderating influence, providing a strong incentive for the
decision makers to act in a way they can justify to a court or analogous review board. In-
dependent oversight also serves an important educative function, helping to ensure that
officials learn about and take steps to correct errors. In its absence, ineffective or unneces-
sary restraints are much more likely to persist.").
140. Scott Pelley, Into Dangerous Hands, CBS NEWS (Nov. 8, 2015), http://www.cbsne
ws.com/news/into-dangerous-hands-60-minutes/.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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flag and asking Manning what it meant and he said, "[i]t means
absolutely nothing to me. I hold no allegiance to this country and
the people in it."''
Although he did not have a security clearance, Omar Mateen,
who killed forty-nine people in an Orlando nightclub, one of the
worst mass murders in American history, worked for one of the
world's premier private security companies, G4S.'46 G4S obtained
a $234 million contract from the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity and had past contracts with the State Department, Justice
Department, Energy Department, Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion, Army, and Air Force.'47
Deciding who is a security threat is fraught with difficulties. In
deciding who is trustworthy, are we really deciding who is like
us? If someone is different, do they then appear less trustworthy?
"There are no actuarial models or empirically tested criteria for
identifying who might in fact pose a security threat."'' 8 Do the
contractors doing the background checks have the necessary ex-
pertise to understand someone's background who may be differ-
ent, but be someone who can fill a critical need for the country?
We need people with language abilities who may have traveled
extensively abroad and are risk-takers. These individuals may
not easily pass a security clearance.
Although courts defer to the Executive Branch because of a
perceived expertise, and we therefore cannot know what has hap-
peried in the security clearance area because it is, indeed, classi-
fied, an example from the immigration setting is illuminating.
The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIN') denied two aliens
withholding of removal, finding they were a danger to the securi-
ty of the United States.'49 However, in examining the evidence
145. Id.
146. Alan Blinder et al., Omar Mateen: From Early Promise to F.B.I. Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/13/us/omar-mateen-early-signs-
of-promise-then-abuse-and-suspected-terrorist-ties.html?_r=l; Michael Daly et al., Omar
Mateen, Terrorist Who Attacked Orlando Gay Club, Had Been Investigated by FBI, DAILY
BEAST (June 12, 2016), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/06/12/omar-mateen-id-
d-as-orlando-killer.html.
147. Bridget Johnson, Senator to DHS: How Did Omar Mateen Pass Employment
Check with Federal Contractor?, PJ MEDIA (June 29, 2016), https://pjmedia.com/homela
nd-security20l60629senator-to-dhs-how-did-omar-mateen-pass-employment-check-with
-federal-contractor/.
148. Daskal, supra note 139, at 366.
149. Yusupovv. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 650 F.3d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 2011).
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against them, the Third Circuit found many deficiencies, includ-
ing the fact that evidence of a terror link from computer materi-
als was, in reality, merely videos from Al Jazeera."' 'Ioreover,
contrary to the BIA's finding, several of the videos, including that
of bin Laden, originated from Al Jazeera, a recognized news
source.""1 1 This is indeed frightening for anyone who is even stud-
ying Arabic and may use Al Jazeera or other Arabic language
sites as learning material. The Third Circuit summed up their
position:
We are acutely cognizant that, in most respects, Congress has dele-
gated issues of national security with respect to aliens to the agen-
cies that deal with immigration, most particularly to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. We recognize that the BIA is in a position of
knowledge superior to that of the federal courts. Nonetheless, we re-
tain our historic, indeed constitutional authority, to review executive
agencies' determinations, giving their determinations due defer-
152
ence.
We need a similar deference to the Executive Branch in the secu-
rity clearance decision process, but there needs to be review so
that people who have watched Al Jazeera are not denied a securi-
ty clearance because they are honing the language skills we need
so badly.
B. Current Reforms
We need to examine the level of material that is classified, 153
and who really needs a security clearance and at what level.'54 As
150. Id. at 985.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 992.
153. See generally DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
206 (1998) ('There may be some basis for short-term classification while plans are being
made, or negotiations are going on, but apart from details of weapons systems, there is
very rarely any real risk to current national security from the publication of facts relating
to transactions in the past, even the fairly recent past. This is the lesson of the Pentagon
Papers experience") (quoting Erwin Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The Courts and
Classified Information, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25). See generally Steven After-
good, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & POLY REV. 399
(2009) (discussing how to reform the classification system to reduce over-classifying infor-
mation).
154. See generally Max Fisher, Top Secret Clearance Holders So Numerous They In-
clude Packers/Craters, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ne
ws/worldviews/wp/2013/06/12/top-secret-clearance-holders-so-numerous-they-include-pack
erscraters/ (discussing the questionable extent to which security clearances have been
granted to employees in the United States Intelligence Community); Brian Fung, 5.1 Mil-
lion Americans Have Security Clearances. That's More Than the Entire Population of Nor-
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of 2014, an estimated 4,514,576 Americans held or were approved
to hold a clearance. 55 If there are fewer clearances, we can devote
more resources to making sure those with security clearances are
properly cleared. In the words of Donald Rumsfeld, former Secre-
tary of Defense, "I have long believed that too much material is
classified across the federal government as a general rule... ,,16
Still relevant today is the recommendation of Daniel Patrick
Moynihan's 1997 Commission on Protecting and Reducing Gov-
ernment Secrecy that, "[t]he best way to ensure that secrecy is re-
spected, and that the most important secrets remain secret, is for
secrecy to be returned to its limited but necessary role. Secrets
can be protected more effectively if secrecy is reduced overall.""' 7
In fact, there is so much secrecy and classifications that scholars
have advocated for leaks as a way of informing the public on un-
necessarily classified issues."'
There is not even a uniform definition of Secret/Top Secret or
what jobs need what clearance." 9 Although 95 percent of security
clearances are done by the Office of Personnel Management
("OPM"), the other 5 percent are done by twenty-one different
agencies, mostly within the intelligence community, all with their
own procedures.'6 ' This leads to a situation where someone could
way, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/20
14/03/24/5-1-million-americans-have-security-clearances-that's-more-than-the-entire-popu
lation-of-norway/ (discussing the ballooning number of Americans with security clearanc-
es).
155. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, 2014 REPORT ON SECURITY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS (2015), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2015-4-21 /20
Annual% 20Report%20ono20Security%20Clearance%2ODeterminations.pdf.
156. Donald H. Rumsfeld, War of the Words, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at A12.
157. REP. OF THE COMM'N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, S.
DOC. NO. 105-2, at XXI (1st Sess. 1997), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CDOC-105s
doc2/content-detail.html.
158. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 575 (2013) ("The
bloated official secrecy system sends an opposite signal: that the government has some-
thing to hide. When the American people learn the executive branch classified more than
ninety-five million items last fiscal year, without learning anything about the content of
those items, the effect is not likely to inspire trust. Concealment on such a scale inspires,
instead, the belief that national security policy is a realm of nonaccountability. Leaks are
holes in the wall that encircles this realm, rays of sunlight from a shadow world .... ").
159. See John V. Berry, The Department of Energy Security Clearance Process,
SECURITY CLEARANCE L. BLOG (July 7, 2015), http://www.securityclearanceblog.com/pa
ge/2/ ("Most federal agencies use similar language when discussing clearance levels. The
most common terminology used to describe clearance levels is Confidential, Secret and Top
Secret. At the DoE this is different. At DoE there are two types of security clearances, the
L and the Q clearances. The L clearance is similar to a Confidential and Secret clearance
and the E clearance is equivalent to a Top Secret (TS) security clearance.").
160. See OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, SUITABILITY AND SECURITY PROCESSES REVIEW 2
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be denied a top secret security clearance by one agency, but still
acquire a top secret clearance from another agency. There is mis-
trust between agencies as they think their procedures are better,
or they simply do not trust the procedures of another agency.161
There is a plan to develop a new agency, the National Back-
ground Investigations Bureau ("NBIB"), within the OPM, to con-
duct security checks, but it still leaves most of the intelligence
agencies able to separately handle their own security clearanc-
162
es.
A recent hack of the OPM system highlights these inadequa-
cies.
The hackers' access was so extensive that U.S. officials said they
think it is "highly likely" that every file associated with an OPM-
managed security clearance application since 2000 was exposed [a
total of 22.1 million people]. . . . The CIA, largely appears to have
been shielded from damage, especially for employees who have never
worked at any other agency, officials said.
161
Some reforms in response to recent events are being made. Af-
ter strong criticisms following the Snowden case, where his on-
line record would have yielded information about his anti-
government stance, new legislation was passed in December
2015, allowing background investigators to examine applicants'
social media accounts.' Congressman Jason Chaffetz said "we
(2014); Katherine L. Herbig & Peter R. Nelson, Reciprocity: A Progress Report,
PERSEREC, Tech. Rep. 04-2, at xi (2004).
161. See Herbig & Nelson, supra note 160, at 33.
162. See Exec. Order No. 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Gov-
ernment Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to
Classified National Security Information, 73 Fed. Reg. 38,103 (July 2, 2008); Jamal
Brown, Modernizing & Strengthening the Security & Effectiveness of Federal Background
Investigations, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 22, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2016/01122/modernizing-strengthening-security-effectiveness-federal-background-inve
stigations.
163. Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People,
Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comne
ws/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-peo
pie-federal-authorities-say.
164. See 5 U.S.C. § 11001 (Supp. II 2012) (instructing the Director of National Intelli-
gence to create policies for checking social media in security checks); see also Andrew Katz,
Potential Blind Spots in Clearance Process that Gave Snowden Top-Secret Access, TIME
(June 15, 2013), http://nation.time.com20l3/06/15/potential-blind-spots-in-clearance-pro
cess-that-gave-snowden-top-secret-access/ ("Just days after Snowden's unveiling, snippets
from more than a decade of his online history were uncovered that could have been cause
for investigators' concern: He was a prolific commenter on government and security issues,
rallied against civil surveillance and contributed to Ron Paul's campaign at least twice
last year. Ironically, the government might be able to prevent leaks like the one that re-
vealed a widespread Internet surveillance program if they do a little more online detective
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give top security clearance ... and we can't go online and look at
their social media ... Go hire a bunch of teenagers. They'd do it
better than we're doing it."'1 The federal government will now
begin looking at applicants' social media posts as part of the secu-
rity clearance process because information on Face-
book, Twitter, and similar sites is increasingly viewed as an im-
portant and relevant part of someone's background.166 Also
included is a plan to look continuously at employees, not just at
set intervals. '67
A candidate's first contact with the agency he or she is going to
work for is the security clearance process. The lack of transparen-
cy in the security clearance process and undue delay can cause
grave misgivings in the people who we want to work for the gov-
ernment. In an effort to solve the problem of candidates waiting
years to be cleared, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 required the President to submit an annual report to
Congress on the security clearance process, "to include the total
number of security clearances across government and in-depth
metrics on the timeliness of security clearance determination in
the Intelligence Community."'66 At the CIA, there are seventy-
eight people who have been waiting over a year for their clear-
ance, and at NSA, 115 people have been waiting for over a year.
169
Interestingly, the report does not detail how long over a year the-
se candidates have been waiting.17 Every year, the report states,
"The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to face timeliness
challenges in clearing individuals with unique or critical skills-
such as highly desirable language abilities-who often have sig-
nificant foreign associations that may take additional time to in-
work.").
165. Joe Davidson, Is Obama Administration's New Security Clearance Plan Just
'Happy Talk?, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power
post/wp/2016/02/25/officials-get-skeptical-questions-on-security-clearance-plan.
166. Damian Paletta, Social Media Posts Now Fair Game in Security Clearance Pro-
cess, WALL ST. J. (May 13, 2016, 3:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-posts-
now-fair-game-in-security-clearance-process- 1463 167475.
167. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT
DIRECTIVE 5: COLLECTION, USE, AND RETENTION OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOCIAL MEDIA
INFORMATION IN PERSONNEL SECURITY BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS
1, 3 (1992).
168. OFFICE OF THE Din. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, 2011 REPORT ON SECURITY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS 2 (2011).
169. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, 2015 REPORT ON SECURITY
CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS 11 (2015).
170. See id.
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vestigate and adjudicate."'71 We need to prioritize intelligence
agency candidates, with critical skills, or at least not clear the
easy candidates and leave those with critical language abilities
and expertise languishing for years because they are a bit more
complicated.'72 Waiting for years for a security clearance may en-
courage those with the skills the government needs to begin other
careers, and a security clearance denial with no avenue to contest
leaves the country without the critical skills the government
needs, especially in the counterterrorism arena.
1
1
3
One of the most unpleasant parts of the security clearance pro-
cess is the polygraph exam and its efficacy is seriously in doubt.
Courts rarely find polygraphs admissible at trial because "poly-
graph evidence has long been considered of dubious scientific val-
ue and hence has been deemed irrelevant by the federal courts.' 74
However, they are strangely a seemingly critical component of
the security clearance process within the intelligence agencies.
7
1
The National Research Council declared the polygraph too inac-
curate and called on the federal government to stop using them
as part of the clearance process saying,
tests that are sensitive enough to spot most violators will also mis-
takenly mark large numbers of innocent test takers as guilty. Tests
that produce few of these types of errors, such as those currently
used by several federal agencies, will not catch most major security
violators-and still will incorrectly flag truthful people as decep-
tive."'
171. Id. at 13.
172. See Eggen, supra note 76 (Professor Byman states that "[w]ith any new immigrant
communities [sic], they need these language skills, whether it's Vietnamese or Pakistani
or Arabic .... It also often gives you extra cultural knowledge and sensitivity. It makes
you more sensitive to nuance, which is what investigations are often all about .... It is
easier to get a security clearance if you don't have any interaction with foreigners, which
is not what you want if you want better interaction with foreigners.").
173. See Rowan Scarborough, Lack of Translators Hurts War on Terror, WASH. TIMES
(Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/31/lack-of-translators-
still-hampers-intelligence/ ('"The necessary cadre of U.S. intelligence personnel capable of
reading and speaking targeted regional languages such as Pashto, Dari and Urdu 'remains
essentially nonexistent,' the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote in a rare but
stark warning in its 2010 budget report. The gap has become critical in the war effort, es-
pecially in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater, where al Qaeda and Taliban operatives text
message, e-mail and talk in languages that the intelligence community had largely ig-
nored before 2001.").
174. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 73 (1st Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing Devries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 716 F.2d 939, 945 (1st Cir.1983)).
175. See Application Process, U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: INTELLIGENCE
CAREERS, https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/icapply.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
176. Press Release, National Academy of Sciences, Polygraph Testing Too Flawed for
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In essence, nervous people may fail the polygraph even though
they have nothing to hide, and people who are pathological liars
who can calmly lie will pass. Or, people can be taught to pass."'
Aldrich Ames passed two polygraph exams at the CIA while spy-
ing for Russia, and when asked how he did it, answered, "[w]ell,
[polygraphs] don't work.""17 Once again, when someone fails a pol-
ygraph and then gets their security clearance denied or revoked,
they have no recourse.
The MSPB has semi-judicial procedures that provide some pro-
tection for federal employees, and the Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals publishes its security clearance decisions for con-
tractors online,1"9 but the security clearance decisions of the intel-
ligence community operate completely internally. Although advo-
cating for judicial review, there should at the very least be a
formal review board for the intelligence agencies, instead of the
current shadowy, internal structure at agencies like the CIA8 0
and NSA.
IV. NOT A BATTLEFIELD DECISION, LEGAL ISSUES
Legal issues such as whether there has been discrimination in
deciding a security clearance are very different from deciding
whether there should be a drone strike or a counterterrorism op-
eration. Courts are "institutionally ill-equipped 'to assess the na-
ture of battlefield decisions.""'" In the words of former Defense
Department General Counsel, Jeh Johnson,
Judges are accustomed to making legal determinations based on a
defined, settled set of facts-a picture that has already been paint-
Security Screening (Oct. 8, 2002), http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem
.aspx?RecordID=10420.
177. Martin Kaste, Trial of Polygraph Critic Renews Debate Over Test's Accuracy,
NA'L PuB. RADIO (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/01/02/371925732/trial-of-poly
graph-critic-renews-debate-over-tests-accuracy.
178. Jeff Stein, Lie Detectors Lie (Tell the C.I.A.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1995), http://
www.nytimes.com/1995/02/19/opinion/lie-detectors-lie-tell-the-cia.html.
179. Industrial Security Program, DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS,
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/doha (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
180. See, e.g., Ranger v. Tenet, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2003) ('Mr. Ranger ap-
pealed the denial of his security clearance through the administrative process offered by
the CIA. He was denied the opportunity to appear in person before an adjudicative author-
ity; however, he did eventually meet with Mr. Tenet, who was the CIA's Acting Director at
the time. Mr. Tenet promised to 'follow [Mr.] Ranger's appeals process to closure."').
181. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting DaCosta v.
Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1155 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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ed; not a moving target, which is what we are literally talking about
here. These are not one-time-only judgments and we want military
and national security officials to continually assess and reassess the-
se two questions up until the last minute before an operation. If the-
se types of continual reassessments must be submitted to a member
of the Article III branch of government for evaluation, I believe we
compromise our government's ability to conduct these operations ef-
fectively. The costs will outweigh the benefits.
182
However, courts in security clearance cases are not deciding upon
a moving target-most security clearance cases would involve is-
sues of discrimination or retaliation that judges are completely
qualified to make.
Courts make many complex decisions outside the realm of any
judge's personal expertise every day. Courts often have to make
decisions that involve complex scientific evidence. A trial judge,
acting as gatekeeper, must "ensure that any and all scientific tes-
timony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."'83
As Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Joiner, judges will
sometimes have to make "subtle and sophisticated determina-
tions about scientific methodology and its relation to the conclu-
sions an expert witness seeks to offer." '184 However, despite the dif-
ficulty, judges must make these decisions even though "judges are
not scientists and do not have the scientific training that can fa-
cilitate the making of such decisions."'85 As Judge Kaplan has
pointed out, "criminal cases arising out of alleged terrorist activi-
ty can be tried quite readily in Article III courts. We have been
doing it for over twenty years."'86
As for the fact that classified information may play a role in a
given case, "Article III judges can receive highly sensitive classi-
fied information ex parte; in Washington, D.C., the infrastructure
for doing this already exists. ' There are also already mecha-
nisms in place for attorneys to receive clearances if that is
deemed necessary in a case. And the judiciary is "one of the more
182. Jeh Johnson, Keynote Address at the Center on National Security at Fordham
Law School: A "Drone Court": Some Pros and Cons (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.lawfare
blog.comjeh-johnson-speech-drone-court-some-pros-and-cons.
183. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
184. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 148.
186. Lewis A. Kaplan, The Implications of Trying National Security Cases in Article HI
Courts, 8 J. NAT'L SEcuRITY L. & POLY 337, 338 (2016).
187. Johnson, supra note 182.
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leak-resistant of government institutions."' Another possibility,
advocated by a number of scholars is the possibility of centraliz-
ing judicial review of terrorist detention hearings in one court,
possibly the D.C. District Court.9 Therefore, the court would ac-
quire any additional expertise needed in security and intelligence
matters over time. 19
Judicial review is necessary in security clearance decisions.
Just as other scholars have argued that the Supreme Court
should reevaluate its deferential stance in national security cases
more generally,' it is especially true in the security clearance
process where there are easy solutions to any national security
concerns.
Scholars have noticed a similar tension in other areas of na-
tional security law. The Second Circuit in MacWade v. Kelly
looked at the constitutionality of the NYPD subway search pro-
gram where the NYPD set up checkpoints and varied their loca-
tion, staffing, and timing in an effort to "deter terrorists from car-
rying concealed explosives onto the subway system and, to a
lesser extent, to uncover any such attempt."'92 However, the court
stated that it was not conducting a "searching examination of ef-
fectiveness" because the "decision is best left to those with 'a
unique understanding of, and responsibility for, limited public re-
sources, including a finite number of police officers.""93 Professor
Rascoff pointed out "the court [in MacWade] rejected the plain-
tiffs' contention that assessment of constitutionality necessitates
a measurement of the program's deterrent effect. Thus, reviewing
188. Philip D. Reed Lecture Series, Panel Discussion, The State Secrets Privilege and
Access to Justice: What is the Proper Balance?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 9 (2011).
189. Daphne Barak-Erez & Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and the Due Process
of Terrorist Detentions, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3, 56 (2009).
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 887, 945 (2012) ("At the end of the day, it is quite plausible to think the ordinary pro-
cess of litigation, informed by the government and its adversaries, is more likely to yield a
correct answer to legal questions than the abbreviating punctuation of a structural consti-
tutional presumption."); David Rudenstine, Courts and National Security: The Ordeal of
the State Secrets Privilege, 44 U. BALT. L. REV. 37, 96 (2014) ("Perhaps in time individual
justices on the Supreme Court will reconsider the Court's deferential disposition in na-
tional security cases, and write opinions that chart a new course-a course in which the
Court functions as a third co-equal and independent branch of government that provides
meaningful judicial review of Executive policies and conduct, even in cases implicating
national security.").
192. MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 2006).
193. Id. at 273 (quoting Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454 (1990)).
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courts essentially cede the task of assessing efficacy to the very
officials who design and operate the challenged programs. ' '
Professor Sinnar examined the so-called rule of law tropes
where the Executive Branch publicizes the fact that it is operat-
ing under the law, but because there is no review of its decisions
there is no way to actually know whether it is.'9
In seeking to insulate national security conduct from external re-
view, executive officials often publicize self-imposed rules that ap-
pear to subject their authority to familiar, well-established legal
standards from constitutional or international law. But executive of-
ficials sometimes invoke such standards in public while deviating
from prevalent interpretations of those constraints in secret. The ef-
fect is to mislead courts, policymakers, and the public about the ex-
tent to which national security actions threaten individual rights
and democratic values. 1
96
The security clearance process is another area where the Execu-
tive Branch insists they are operating according to law, but it is
completely internally regulated so it is immune from any type of
substantive review. The CIA's website states, "[t]he clearance
process .... is strictly governed by rules and regulations derived
from Federal statute and executive orders."'97 The process may be
strictly governed, but it is in the dark, with their own internal
policies.
It is fundamental to our society that an individual should have
access to court when wronged, especially something that is so in-
credibly important that it affects the individual's ability to
work.19 Once denied a security clearance, not only does an indi-
vidual lose their current position, but it makes it almost impossi-
ble to acquire any job that also requires a security clearance.'99
Furthermore, many of the jobs in intelligence require skills that
are not easily transferable to the private sector. After years of be-
194. Samuel Rascoff, Counterterrorism and the New Deterrence, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 830,
866 (2014).
195. Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1566,
1566 (2016).
196. Id.
197. Consent Agreement, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ehl/consent
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ing a spy, exactly what job are you qualified for? In a system in
which security clearances can be revoked for arguably unjustifia-
ble or misguided reasons, will agencies critical to our nation's se-
curity truly be able to attract the best and brightest? Consider
the example of Adam Ciralsky, a CIA staff attorney whose securi-
ty clearance was revoked and employment was terminated after
two failed polygraph examinations related to his previous em-
ployment. °° Whether the CIA based its decision to terminate Ci-
ralsky's employment on his alleged lack of candor or, as Ciralsky
suggested, discrimination, Ciralsky-an apparently talented po-
tential employee of the CIA, instead pursued another, albeit suc-
201
cessful career path in the private sector.
Once reformed, the security clearance process should be uni-
form. In an age in which lone wolf and ISIS-inspired terrorists
pose a deadly potential threat to America, local authorities are
playing an even greater role than ever in preventing terrorism.0 2
As a result, authorities such as the FBI, CIA, and local police
must be able to effectively work together. If the security clearance
process becomes uniform, then hopefully at least one part of the
information-sharing problem will be solved.
The Supreme Court has shown in Boumediene v. Bush that it
can give deference to the Executive Branch, without giving abso-
lute deference. The Court starts by acknowledging that the Exec-
utive Branch needs to be able to respond quickly to threats that
may arise:
Unlike the President and some designated Members of Congress,
neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our
Nation and its people. The law must accord the Executive substan-
tial authority to apprehend and detain those who pose a real danger
• 203to our security.
The Court then states, "[o]ur opinion does not undermine the Ex-
ecutive's powers as Commander in Chief. On the contrary, the ex-
ercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed
200. See, e.g., Vernon Loeb, CIA Says 'Lack of Candor' Led to Firing, WASH. POST, Feb.
6, 2010, at A10.
201. See, e.g., 'Nightly News' Wins 2 Emmy Awards, NBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2007, 10:27
AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/21577507/ns/nbc-nightly-news withbrian-williams/t/ni
ghtly-news-wins-emmy-awards/#.WJt9U7YrJ-V.
202. See PETER BERGEN, THE UNITED STATES OF JIHAD 57 (2016).
203. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
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by the Judicial Branch.""4 In holding that prisoners in Guan-
tanamo are entitled to the fundamental procedural protection of
habeas corpus, the Court stated, "[t]he laws and Constitution are
designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times.
Liberty and security can be reconciled; and in our system they are
reconciled within the framework of the law. 2 °5
Fear tactics, such as Scalia's assertion in his Boumediene dis-
sent that the judgment of his colleagues would "cause more Amer-
icans to be killed,' 206 do not make us safer. Absolute deference to
the executive can actually have the opposite effect.
The definition of a security clearance is whether a person has
access to classified information, up to the authorized clearance
level. Even then, individuals with a security clearance should on-
ly have access to information they have the "need to know. 207 Ob-
taining a security clearance is a prerequisite for employment with
the CIA; however, the CIA considers the "whole person" and rec-
ognizes that "no one is perfect":
The Agency recognizes no one is perfect. Agency security officials
consider the nature, extent, seriousness, and recency of past behav-
ior. They weigh the potential risk and benefit of each individual-the
whole person-with utmost care. Although national security is al-
ways the paramount consideration, our security experts work hard
to ensure the Agency does not turn away unnecessarily someone who
could make important contributions to the nation's intelligence ef-
fort.
208
Although agency discretion in granting security clearances is
necessary to ensure that intelligence agencies get qualified can-
didates, it is worrisome because there is no judicial review or
oversight of these decisions.
204. Id.; see Rick Pildes, Does Judicial Review of National-Security Policies Constrain
or Enable the Government?, LAWFARE (Aug. 5, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://www.lawfare
blog.com/2013/08/does-judicial-review-of-national-security-policies-constrain-or-enable-the
-government ('Those resistant to judicial review, including the government, can too easily
lose sight of this power of courts to legitimate government action.").
205. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
206. Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Security Clearance FAQs, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/mlds/clear
ances/c10977.htm#5 (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) ("A clearance allows a person filling a spe-
cific position to have access to classified national security information up to and including
the level of clearance that they hold, so long as the person has a need to know the infor-
mation."); see Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009) (discussing the clas-
sification of national security information).
208. Application Process, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/careers/ap
plication-process (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
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At the very least, cases involving fundamental rights under the
Constitution or Title VII should be subject to judicial review. As
the Fourth Circuit stated in United States v. Marchetti, "[s]ince
First Amendment rights are involved, we think Marchetti would
be entitled to judicial review of any action by the CIA disapprov-
ing publication of the material. Some such review would seem es-
sential to the enforcement of the prior restraint imposed upon
Marchetti and other former employees."2"9 Judicial review of secu-
rity clearance denial and revocation cases will increase transpar-
ency and strengthen the security clearance process.
CONCLUSION
The security clearance process may never be perfect. It is im-
possible to decide with 100 percent certainty who represents a se-
curity threat and who does not. The highly discretionary process
may lead to inconsistencies in situations where one person may
think a cleared individual is a whistleblower, but another person
thinks the cleared individual is a grave security threat who
leaked important classified information. However, the security
clearance process is most individuals' first contact with the agen-
cy for whom they are going to work. The current shadowy system,
in which an individual may wait years for a top secret security
clearance with the CIA, is untenable, especially because many in-
dividuals who wait the longest or are ultimately denied a clear-
ance are those we need most-candidates who have lived over-
seas, with critical language abilities, and extensive foreign
contacts.210 The CIA is trying to attract the best and the brightest
candidates, and although some committed individuals will stay
the course, others will either pursue other employment, or will
begin employment with severe misgivings about their employer
and the hiring process. When someone is denied a security clear-
ance, or their clearance is revoked, they are then unable to chal-
lenge the denial or revocation on the merits in a court of law.
Some may not even be completely aware of the reason their secu-
209. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir. 1972).
210. See, e.g., CIA Values Language Capabilities Among Employees, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/20
10-featured-story-archive/cia-values-language-capabilities.html (last updated Apr. 30,
2013).
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rity clearance was denied or revoked. When an individual be-
lieves their security clearance has been revoked for retaliation or
discriminatory purposes, they should be able to challenge that de-
cision in court.. These decisions are unlike wartime decisions that
need to be made as events unfold. Article III courts are complete-
ly competent to make security clearance review decisions brought
under the Constitution or Title VII.
